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OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of Dong Tack Suh Application No. 10/812,342 Filed: March 29, 2004

Attorney Docket No. 51278/RAH/C1015

This is a decision on the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)¹, filed November 5, 2007, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration of this decision must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)". This is **not** final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

This application became abandoned for failure to timely reply to the Final Office Action mailed May 4, 2006. A response was filed June 29, 2006, but by Advisory Action of August 19, 2006, petitioner was advised that the response did not place the application in condition for allowance. A second response was filed September 19, 2006 (certificate of mail date September 14, 2006) with a one month extension of time request. The request only extended the time for response to September 4, 2006, therefore since the response was filed September 19, 2006, the application became abandoned. Accordingly, a Notice of Abandonment was mailed September 6, 2006.

PETITION UNDER 37 CFR 1.137(a)

The Commissioner may revive an abandoned application if the delay in responding to

¹Effective December 1, 1997, the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) now provide that where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b). A grantable petition filed under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by:

⁽¹⁾ the required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof.

⁽²⁾ the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m);

⁽³⁾ a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional. The Commissioner may required additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional; and

⁽⁴⁾ any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c)).

the relevant outstanding Office requirement is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be "unavoidable". Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.³

The showing of record is inadequate to establish unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 133 and 37 CFR 1.137(a).⁴ Specifically, an application is "unavoidably" abandoned only where petitioner, or counsel for petitioner, takes all action necessary for a proper response to the outstanding Office action, but through the intervention of unforeseen circumstances, such as failure of mail, telegraph, facsimile, or the negligence of otherwise reliable employees, the response is not timely received in the Office.⁵

The petition notes that the petitioner confirmed with the Examiner over the telephone the status of the claims and therefore filed an amendment canceling the rejected claims and placing the allowable claims in allowable form. No other amendments were made. Petitioner further argues that since no amendments were made other than to cancel rejected claims and to place the objected claims in allowable form (as confirmed with the Examiner over the telephone, petitioner expected the amendment to be entered, and waited for a Notice of Allowance to be mailed.

²35 U.S.C. § 133.

³In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912)(quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913). In addition, decisions on revival are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 USPQ 977, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Finally, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable." Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316-17, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1131-32 (N.D. Ind. 1987).

^{*}See MPEP 711(c)(III)(C)(2) for a discussion of the requirements for a showing of unavoidable delay.

⁵Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31 (Comm'r Pat. 1887).

Petitioner's arguments have been considered but are not persuasive.

It is the applicant's responsibility to take the necessary action in an application under a final Office action to provide a complete and proper reply. The fact that the examiner may or may not have entered an amendment in an application prior to the end of the period for reply does not relieve applicant of the responsibility to submit a complete and proper reply prior to the end of the statutory period for reply in order to avoid abandonment. Petitioner's failure to take any action in furtherance of the required reply by the due date is the cause of the delay which if Petitioner had been diligent in ensuring that the amendment was entered could have avoided the abandonment. Rather, the failure to act represents a showing of a lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner.

A delay resulting from the lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice or the MPEP does not constitute an "unavoidable" delay. A delay caused by an applicant's lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice or the MPEP is not rendered "unavoidable" due to: (1) the applicant's reliance upon oral advice from Office employees; or (2) the Office's failure to advise the applicant of any deficiency in sufficient time to permit the applicant to take corrective action.

In summary, the showing of record is that rather than unavoidable delay, the delay in filing a response to the Final Office Action was due to a lack of diligence on the part of petitioner in prosecution of the application. As petitioner has presented no showing of unavoidable delay, the petition will be dismissed.

As the present petition was filed and decided under both 37 CFR 1.137(a) and (b) petitioner's deposit account no. 03-1728 has been charged in the amount of \$255.00 for treatment of the petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a)

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail: Mail Stop Petitions

Commissioner for Patents

P.O. Box 1450

Alexandria VA 22313-1450

⁶See Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 317, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (N.D. Ind. 1987), Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 230 USPQ 621, 624 (D.D.C. 1985); Smith v. Diamond, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); Potter v. Dann, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); Ex parte Murray, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 130, 131 (1891).

⁷See In re Sivertz, 227 USPQ 255, 256 (Comm'r Pat. 1985); see also In re Colombo, Inc., 33 USPQ2d
1530, 1532 (Comm'r Pat. 1994) (while the Office attempts to notify applicants of deficiencies in their responses in a manner permitting a timely correction, the Office has no obligation to notify parties of deficiencies in their responses in a manner permitting a timely correction).

By FAX:

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Attn: Office of Petitions

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter may be directed to the undersigned

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